2013 Dreamliner production issues portend Boeing whistle blower's claims in 2024?

Two hours out of Amsterdam this AM on the flight from Salt Lake City, I listened to Patrick Ben David's podcast where he interviewed Robert Turkowitz, the attorney of the Boeing whistleblower, John Barnett, who took his life earlier this month. Barnett, who was found dead in a parked car after blowing the whistle on widespread safety violations at Boeing, had previously claimed he had been "harassed, denigrated, and humiliated" for raising concerns about quality control issues. Listening to Turkowitz, I remembered that Barnett's claims were not the first I had heard about quality control issues at Boeing. On 01 February 2013, Tim Fehr, retired Chief Engineer of Airplane Systems, Boeing, was speaker at our ROMEO group, La Societe Deux Magots (LSDM). Following is a quote from Tim's speaker notes from that talk (full Tim Fehr speaker notes attached).

In manufacture of aircraft prior to the 787, where a higher percentage of the aircraft was built "in house," Boeing had a strong systems integration function. As much of the 787 production was outsourced, Boeing gave up some of the systems integration function that had ensured well-coordinated development and production, prior to the 787, of its aircraft. With the 787, Boeing, in some cases, expected systems integration to be performed by its subcontractors. Delays in the final delivery of the 787, close to three years, occurred because of less than satisfactory sub-contractor product... a fault that might have been prevented by stronger, centralized systems integration, long a hall mark of Boeing aircraft development and manufacture. It is not known whether stronger systems integration from Boeing would have prevented the "battery problems" that have grounded the 787, but Tim pointed out the tautology - and challenge for management - between lowering costs by outsourcing on the one hand and need for strong systems integration on the other.

Though systems integration issues with the 787 Dreamliner may have little to do with Barnett's claim, eleven years later, that the Charleston, S.C., Boeing operation exhibited widespread safety violations, I can't help wondering if Boeing's putative safety difficulties today didn't originate with the management mind set leading to quality control compromises in the Dreamliner. Fehr's boss, Walt Orlowski, Boeing Chief Engineer (17K engineer reports) suggested in a 01 January 2013 speech to LSDM (speaker notes also attached) that when Boeing started appointing finance guys as CEO instead of engineering guys, quality control and safety may have been compromised.

Add to safety procedure violations and systems integration compromises, the specter of DEI, as opposed to merit, as a hiring criterion, and it may be time to do some serious worrying about flying safety. Buy Airbus planes?