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"The Grand Scuttle" by Dan Van Der Vat

Above: The Grand Scuttle - Dan Van Der Vat - 248 pages.

In fact, the book, makes the credible argument that the rise of German naval militarism was the proximate cause of WWI.

I completed reading this book today.

At Scapa Flow on 21 June 1919, there occurred an event unique in naval history. The German High Seas Fleet, one of the most formidable fleets ever built, was deliberately sent to the bottom of the sea at the British Grand Fleet's principal anchorage at Orkney by its own officers and men.

I was at Scapa Flow on 21 September 2019, just a bit more than one hundred years after German Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter became the only man in history to sink his own navy... some four hundred thousand tons.... 54 ships, including 20 or so capital ships.

After the Armistice of WWI was declared on 11 November 1918, something had to be done to neuter the German fleet, most of which was berthed at the German port of Wilhelmshaven.

It was decided that the fleet, still technically under German command, should be put in a neutral harbor pending finalizing negotiations of the Armistice at Versailles. No neutral harbor could be found. So, it was decided to harbor the fleet at Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands in far north Scotland, under the watchful eye of the British navy.

Scapa Flow was a natural deep water harbor which where the British kept the bulk of their fleet during each of the two world wars.

The book is more than the story of a scuttled fleet. It is the story of how Germany in just a decade and a half rose from virtually no navy at all, to become a formidable sea power with two thirds of the tonnage of the British Navy by the start of World War I in August of 1914. In fact, the book, makes the credible argument that the rise of German naval militarism was the proximate cause of WWI, citing numerous incidents occurring during the century's first decade where German belligerence at sea made her European neighbors more than a bit nervous.

Germany had never been a naval power in Europe. After Germany's victory in the Franco Prussian War in 1870 they were the strongest land military power in Europe.

But, young Kaiser Wilhelm was antsy. After pushing the revered and capable Bismarck aside, the young, capricious, some say unstable, Kaiser decided that Germany needed a navy so as to extend its influence in the world. Seagoing powers like France and England were divvying up all the spoils from their colonial exploits in the Far East and Africa. Shouldn't the Germans get in on the game?

The Kaiser got a hold of a memorandum written by a mid-level seaman, Alfred von Tirpitz, that argued for the buildup of a German fleet, together with the way that buildup should take place.

The Kaiser cottoned on to Tirpitz and endorsed his plan. Tirpitz sparked the buildup of the German navy and became its head in the space of fifteen short years.

As earlier mentioned, the German naval build-up in the first decade of the twentieth century made everyone, especially the Brits, nervous. German engineers made some changes to conventional ship building techniques. German battle ships had one third the coal carrying capacity as English dreadnaughts. This enabled them to build narrower, faster ships and use more amour platting. Why less coal capacity, for example? German's felt that their ships, for the most part, would be oriented to North Sea confrontations and would never be that far from port.

Tirpitz knew that by the time war would come, the German navy (High Seas Fleet) would never compete ship for ship with the British navy (Grand Fleet). But, he strategized that with clever baiting, and through the use of submarines, the German navy could whittle down the size of the Grand Fleet and render it ineffective over time.

During WWI there was only one major conflict, that in the North Sea, involving capital ships of the Grand Fleet and the High Seas fleet. In terms of tonnage and life lost in the Battle of Jutland, May 31 2016 (just a month before Somme on the Western Front), the Germans came out on top.

Yet, after returning to port after the Battle of Jutland, the German fleet never left Wilhelmshaven for the remainder of the war. So, while the Brits didn't technically win The Battle of Jutland, the broader war objectives of the Grand Fleet were met as the High Seas Fleet was kept at bay for the rest of the war.

The first half of the book chronicles in detail the above outline... then , moves to events leading up to the scuttling of the High Seas Fleet at Scapa Flow in the second half of the book.

Highly regarded Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter was asked to take command of the interned German fleet after the war. The book goes into the admiral's background. He was a patriot, an accomplished navy man, highly regarded in every respect. It was out of a respect for the Fatherland that he undertook the humiliating task of stewarding the High Seas Fleet during the ambiguous period of internship.

How Reuter led in the internment exercise.... how he handled mutinous elements amongst crew of his capital ships... how he dealt with the haughty Brits...descriptions of the techniques of ship scuttling, makes for fascinating reading.

Reuter scuttled the ships based on faulty information... that Versailles was not going well, and that hostilities could well resume.

Hearing of the news of the scuttling, allied leaders were publicly incensed, but privately relieved. Had the ships been parceled out to the winners... Italy, France, and the Brits themselves, the balance of naval power would shift away from the Brits. During the Versailles treaty negotiations the Brits were adamant that the High Seas Fleet not be divvied up as spoils. Throughout the treaty negotiations, the problem of the fleet was more or less put in the "too hard" box.

After the scuttling, Reuter and one thousand or so High Seas Fleet crew were converted to POW status, but within six months or so, most had been returned to Germany.

There was a hue and cry to prosecute Reuter for his perfidy, but, after a year or so in captivity, he too was returned to the Fatherland. He wrote a book explaining for his action and maintained the rightness of his action, for which he took sole responsibility, for the rest of his life.
Reuter he died in 1939. Just before he died, he received a note from Kaiser Wilhelm, then exiled in Holland, congratulating him on his patriotism and courage for scuttling the High Seas Fleet.

The final section of the book deals with the salvaging of the ships. The Brits had originally thought that the scuttled ships could just be left to rot in their watery grave. But, it was determined after, that they represented a hazard for shipping in the area. The hulks, resting in 150 feet of water, still, with massive superstructures and stacks, could disrupt shipping.

The stories of the salvaging operations are fascinating.

In one case, a huge battleship was being towed 250 miles from Scapa Flow to the Firth of Forth where it could be cut apart for scrap. A local harbor pilot and the salvager were on the tug pulling the ship towards the famous Firth of Forth railway bridge. They were arguing about towing tactics when, too late, they discovered that the tidal inflow was moving the towed battle ship up river at a faster pace than the tug was pulling. The 25 thousand ton battle ship hulk had strayed to the side such that the battleship was expected to hit the railway bridge. The tug captain had to cut the cables connecting the tug with the battle ship hulk. Fortunately, the battle ship missed the pylons of the bridge and the proverbial bullet was dodged.

For twenty years or so after the scuttling salvaging employed 200 people on Orkney.

This was a fun, fast book to read. I bought the book while visiting Scapa Flow. Reading the book brought to life what really was the closing event of WWI.

Add Scapa Flow to Gallipoli and Flanders for important WWI sites that I have visited in the last three years.